



CHAPTER 4:
NATIONAL
SECURITY



THE WINNING ARGUMENT: John McCain and National Security

I. John McCain will be George Bush's third term on Iraq.

- John McCain said staying in Iraq for 100 years “would be fine with me” and supports maintaining a permanent U.S. troop presence in Iraq. He has tried to defend this comment as referring to 100 years of peace – like Germany or South Korea – but has not said how long he would leave American troops in the middle of a hostile conflict.

II. McCain adheres to the same extreme Neoconservative ideology as Bush.

- John McCain was a Neocon before George Bush was a Neocon. John McCain's circle of foreign policy advisors is made up of the same people who pushed for the war in Iraq.
 - McCain's chief foreign policy advisor, Randy Scheunemann, was the Director of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, a Neocon front group that lobbied the Bush administration to go to war with Iraq even before 9/11. McCain's senior strategist, Charlie Black, also lobbied on behalf of Ahmed Chalabi.
- McCain doesn't understand diplomacy and would continue to alienate our allies. He called our closest allies “vacuous and posturing.” and referred to France and Germany as adversaries. Instead of being strategic about our relationship with Russia, McCain blustered that he would kick them out of the G8.
- McCain ignores critical details about the Middle East, including the differences between Sunnis and Shiites, glossing over important distinctions between different groups and movements and instead lumping them together into a united “Islamofascist” front.
- On Iran, McCain would ignore the diplomatic approach that led to progress with North Korea and pursue Bush's hard-line, militaristic approach that has done nothing but strengthen Iran's hand in the region.

III. McCain was one of the biggest cheerleaders of the Iraq war.

- McCain was right when he said, “no one has supported President Bush on Iraq more than I have.”
- McCain was one of the staunchest defenders of the Administration's war strategy:



- McCain misjudged the post-war situation. On “Meet the Press” in 2002, McCain said, “I believe that it [the war] will not be nearly as difficult as some allege.”ⁱ On “Meet the Press,” he said “I believe that this conflict is still going to be relatively short.”ⁱⁱ In 2003, McCain assured Katie Couric that “the Iraqi people will greet us as liberators.”ⁱⁱⁱ In a 2003 *New York Times* op-ed, McCain wrote that the Iraq War would [“significantly improve the stability of the region.”](#) On “Hardball” in 2003, McCain incorrectly stated, “There's not a history of clashes that are violent between Sunnis and Shiahns. So I think they can probably get along.”^{iv} In April 2003, he claimed that “the end is very much in sight,” and that all that stood in the way would be “a short period of chaos.”^v
- McCain repeatedly defended the Bush administration’s Iraq strategy, including troop levels. In 2003, McCain said he had [“no qualms about our strategic plans.”](#) Shortly after the invasion, he said the Bush administration’s plan was “an appropriate strategy.”^{vi} Years later, he specifically defended the original troop levels sent to Iraq, telling Tim Russert in 2005, “I think we have in numbers [sic] probably enough.”^{vii} In a 2004 interview on ABC News’ “This Week,” McCain said, “I’m confident we’re on the right course.”^{viii}
- McCain repeatedly defended Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. In the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004, McCain said on “Hannity and Colmes,” “Yes, today I do and I believe he’s done a fine job,” McCain responded. “He’s an honorable man.”^{ix} Also in 2004, McCain told John Gibson that he was “an admirer of Secretary Rumsfeld,” that he “didn’t think he could be judged yet,” and that “it’s totally premature to call for any change in his status.”^x In 2006, McCain [refused to join calls for Rumsfeld’s resignation.](#)
- McCain greatly misjudged the cost of the war. Echoing former Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s infamous prediction that Iraq could “finance its own reconstruction,” McCain said in 2003, “As far as the cost is concerned, Iraqis have vast oil reserves and they, I’m sure, would shoulder the cost of the transition.”^{xi}



John McCain's War Cabinet

Matthew Duss

“There’s going to be other wars. I’m sorry to tell you, there’s going to be other wars. We will never surrender, but there will be other wars.”

– John McCain, [1/27/08](#) ([video](#))

John McCain’s foreign policy offers a future of numerous U.S. military interventions in the name of “promoting American values.” He has assembled a team of foreign policy advisers who believe strongly, as he does, that American security requires the robust and relentless exercise of American military power. Here’s a look at those key advisers:

RANDY SCHEUNEMANN

Director of Foreign Policy and National Security

BACKGROUND: Former Congressional aide to Trent Lott and Bob Dole. Co-founder, president and executive director of the [Committee For the Liberation of Iraq](#). Drafter of the [1998 Iraq Liberation Act](#). Project director at the [Project for a New American Century](#) (PNAC). In 1998, founded a firm which lobbied on behalf of the NRA, and later [the governments of Georgia](#) and other [former Soviet Bloc states benefiting](#) from the invasion of Iraq. Claims to have authored McCain’s concept of “[rogue state rollback](#).” Known as “[McCain’s bulldog](#)” for his attacks on McCain’s detractors.

QUOTES:

“[John McCain] does not believe in timetables or deadlines, secret or otherwise.” [New York Observer, [4/11/07](#)]

MAX BOOT

Foreign Policy Adviser

BACKGROUND: A former Wall Street Journal editor and current [senior fellow for national security studies](#) at the Council on Foreign Relations, Boot advocates an imperial role for the United States similar to the British Empire. Believes that the United States needs a “[colonial office](#)” inspired by the British system in India in order to better fulfill its role of transforming the world. Advocate of a sort of foreign legion wherein immigrants and other non-citizens would receive citizenship [in exchange for U.S. military service](#).

QUOTES:



“What can [Democrats] say when the situation in Iraq appears to be looking up?” [Los Angeles Times, [12/16/03](#)]

“Iraq already has confounded many Western ‘progressives’ who doubted that the Arab world could ever make progress. The bus may be rickety and it may have lost some passengers, but — guess what? — it’s on schedule toward its final destination: democracy.” [Los Angeles Times, [3/4/04](#)]

JAMES WOOLSEY

Energy and National Security Adviser

BACKGROUND: Former head of the CIA. Subscribes to the “World War IV” formulation (in which the Cold War was World War III) and believes that the United States has been “at war” with Islamists since 1979, when “[they \[Iranian revolutionaries\] seized our hostages in 1979 in Tehran.](#)” Suggested during an interview on September 12, 2001, [that Iraq had sponsored the 9/11 attacks](#), and also attempted to exhume the discredited idea that Iraq was behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

QUOTES:

“I would submit to you that genetically modified work is going on in Iraq right now. It’s clear that we know that. And I think people who argue for delay, need to take responsibility for the consequences of the delay they’re alleging.” [ABC’s Nightline, 3/4/03]

“I think we ought to execute some air strikes against Syria, against the instruments of power of that state, against the airport, which is the place where the weapons shuttle through from Iran to Hezbollah and Hamas. I think both Syria and Iran think that we’re cowards.” [Fox News’ Big Story with John Gibson, 7/17/06]

BILL KRISTOL

Informal Foreign Policy Adviser

BACKGROUND: Prominent neo-conservative pundit. Founder and editor of the Weekly Standard. Co-founder and chairman of PNAC, current New York Times columnist. Advocates stronger American leadership through the unilateral use of force; co-author with Robert Kagan of essay “[Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy](#)” which advocated “benevolent” American global hegemony based upon military dominance and “elevated patriotism.” Co-author of a book strenuously arguing for the invasion of Iraq. Strong supporter of the surge. Advocates war with Iran. Known to be “[exceptionally close with McCain.](#)”

QUOTES:



The [Iraq] war itself will clarify who was right and who was wrong about weapons of mass destruction. [...] History and reality are about to weigh in, and we are inclined simply to let them render their verdicts.” [The Weekly Standard [3/17/03](#)]

“There’s been a certain amount of pop sociology in America ... that the Shia can’t get along with the Sunni and the Shia in Iraq just want to establish some kind of Islamic fundamentalist regime. There’s almost no evidence of that at all. Iraq’s always been very secular.” [NPR, [4/1/03](#)]

“We’re not in a civil war [in Iraq]. This is just not true....” [Fox News, [7/15/07](#)]

ROBERT KAGAN

Informal Foreign Policy Adviser

BACKGROUND: After serving as an adviser to Congressman Jack Kemp in 1983, and then working as a speechwriter for Secretary of State George Schultz, in 1985 Kagan was chosen by Elliot Abrams to head the Office of Public Diplomacy, whose mission was to [create support](#) for the Nicaraguan Contra rebels. Kagan was a co-founder of PNAC, and is currently a senior associate at [the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace](#). Co-author with Bill Kristol of “[Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy](#)” in which he advocated “benevolent” American global hegemony based upon military dominance and “elevated patriotism.” Advocate of a “[concert of democracies](#)” to supplant the UN Security Council in order to grant legitimacy to U.S. military interventions around the globe. Recently [recognized the need to talk with Iran](#), if only to establish a record to use against Tehran.

QUOTES:

“American power, even deployed under a double standard, may be the best means of advancing progress.” [BBC Documentary, [2003](#)]

MARK SALTER

Senior Adviser

BACKGROUND: McCain’s former Chief of Staff, and co-writer of McCain’s books. Salter [worked for Jeanne Kirkpatrick](#) when she was United Nations ambassador and later when she moved to the American Enterprise Institute. He joined McCain’s staff in 1989, and is “[widely regarded as the senator’s alter ego](#).” In 2006, responded to a college student’s criticism of McCain by saying that it was “very unlikely” that any of the 2006 graduates of New York’s New School University would “[ever possess one small fraction of the character of John McCain](#).”

JOHN BOLTON

Informal Foreign Policy Adviser



BACKGROUND: Former U.S. diplomat, [Senior Vice President for Public Policy Research](#) at the American Enterprise Institute, and member of the Project for the New American Century, Bolton was one of the signers of the January 1998 PNAC letter sent to President Bill Clinton urging him to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In 2005, Bolton was nominated by President Bush to be the U.S.'s representative to the UN, but his nomination met with strong Democratic opposition over Bolton's controversial anti-UN statements and policies. Bolton was eventually given a recess appointment to the UN. He served from 2005 to 2006, and resigned at the end of one term. At a conservative conference in 2008, Bolton described how "[McCain secretly tried to shepherd his nomination to the United Nations.](#)" Bolton currently serves as a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

QUOTES:

"[John McCain] thought I was the type of ambassador that ought to represent the United States at the United Nations." [Huffington Post, [2/8/08](#)],

"While treaties may well be politically or even morally binding, they are not legally obligatory." [Foreign Affairs, [Jan/Feb 1999](#)]

And [many more](#)

GARY SCHMITT

Foreign Policy Adviser

BACKGROUND: AEI Fellow and PNAC signatory. Co-author with [Abram Shulsky](#) (overseer of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans) of a book on the political thought of Leo Strauss as applied to intelligence gathering. Subscribes to the Straussian view that "[deception is the norm in political life](#), and the hope, to say nothing of the expectation, of establishing a politics that can dispense with it is the exception." Advocated war against "the Saddam/bin Laden axis" as a way to "[restore national honor.](#)"

QUOTES:

"In short, Iraq is both equipped with dangerous weapons and out to get the United States...The potential costs of leaving Saddam and his regime in place are simply too high." [The Weekly Standard, [10/29/01](#)]

RALPH PETERS

Informal National Security Adviser

BACKGROUND: Retired U.S. Lieutenant Colonel, novelist and op-ed writer. Called Muqtada al-Sadr "[our mortal enemy](#)" in 2006, but now supports a surge which is built on accommodating Sadr and ratifying his militia's control of formerly Sunni neighborhoods. Suggested "[redrawing](#)



[the Middle East map](#)” in order to better serve American security interests, claiming that “[without such major boundary revisions](#), we shall never see a more peaceful Middle East.”

QUOTES:

“If we can’t leave a democracy behind, we should at least leave the corpses of our enemies. The holier-than-thou response to this proposal is predictable: ‘We can’t kill our way out of this situation!’ Well, boo-hoo. Friendly persuasion and billions of dollars haven’t done the job. Give therapeutic violence a chance.” [New York Post, [10/26/06](#)]

“Iraq could have turned out differently. It didn’t. And we must be honest about it. We owe that much to our troops. They don’t face the mere forfeiture of a few congressional seats but the loss of their lives. Our military is now being employed for political purposes. It’s unworthy of our nation.” [USA Today, [11/2/06](#)]

JOE LIEBERMAN

Supporter and Adviser

BACKGROUND: One of Congress’s strongest Iraq war supporters, former Democrat (current Independent) Lieberman has [bashed Democrats for proposing timelines for withdrawing troops from Iraq](#). Like McCain, Lieberman subscribes to George W. Bush’s “[global war on terror](#)” view (which McCain calls “[a transcendental struggle](#)”) and also supports expansive executive power for prosecuting that war. Lieberman has also advocated [a tax to fund expansion](#) of the military.

QUOTES:

“I’m worried that too many people, both in politics and out, don’t appreciate the seriousness of the threat to American security and the evil of the enemy that faces us..[This threat is] more evil, or as evil, as Nazism and probably more dangerous than the Soviet Communists we fought during the long cold war.” [New York Times, [8/11/06](#)]

“[Hillary Clinton’s and Barack Obama’s] positions on Iraq represent a retreat, which would be a surrender on Iraq.” [The Advocate, [3/16/08](#)]

DANIEL MCKIVERGAN

Campaign Staffer

BACKGROUND: McKivergan is a former research director for the Weekly Standard. He joined McCain’s staff as legislative director in 2000, and in 2002 he became deputy director of the Project for A New American Century, helping to coordinate the push for war in Iraq.

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/03/17/mccain-advisers/>]



McCain Campaign Website Highlights His Judgment On Iraq... Only Since August 2003

Matthew Duss

Promoting the surge-rific leadership of John McCain, senior McCain adviser Steve Schmidt told the Weekly Standard's Stephen Hayes that "[Iraq is a character issue](#)":

"Senator McCain's prescription to correct a failed policy was right. Senator Obama's was wrong," Schmidt continues. "They're not deliberating abstractions. This was a real event that shows whose judgment was right and whose judgment was wrong." [...]

"To some extent, the debate about Iraq is not a debate about Iraq. **It's about leadership, wisdom, and judgment.**"

McCain's campaign website has a fancy [timeline](#)— if only his campaign strategy were as well designed! — showing how and when John McCain was right about Iraq. Interestingly, the timeline **begins in August 2003**.



So while McCain is certainly not modest about trying to claim credit for the 2007 troop surge — which his site graciously refers to as "[The McCain Surge](#)" — he is somewhat more modest about providing examples of his leadership, wisdom, and judgment about Iraq from before August 2003. In the interest of ameliorating this, I've compiled a small sample of McCain's pre-8/03 wisdom:

"Because I know that as successful as I believe we will be, and I believe that the success will be fairly easy, we will still lose some American young men or women." [CNN, 9/24/02]



“We’re not going to get into house-to-house fighting in Baghdad. We may have to take out buildings, but we’re not going to have a bloodletting of trading American bodies for Iraqi bodies.” [CNN, 9/29/02]

“But the point is that, one, we will win this conflict. We will win it easily.” [MSNBC, 1/22/03]

“But I believe, Katie, that the Iraqi people will greet us as liberators.” [NBC, 3/20/03]

“It’s clear that the end is very much in sight.” [ABC, 4/9/03]

“There’s not a history of clashes that are violent between Sunnis and Shiahns. So I think they can probably get along.” [MSNBC, 4/23/03]

McCain’s webmaster should feel free to take these and add them to McCain’s Iraq timeline. And contact Think Progress for more!

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/06/16/since-august-2003/>]



McCain — The Neocon Candidate (Part 1): Firmly In The Interventionist Camp

Matthew Duss

An article in [this morning's New York Times](#) examines the “competition” between realists and neoconservatives in John McCain’s foreign policy:

Senator John McCain has long made his decades of experience in foreign policy and national security the centerpiece of his political identity, and suggests he would bring to the White House a fully formed view of the world.

But now one component of the fractious Republican Party foreign policy establishment — the so-called pragmatists, some of whom have come to view the Iraq war or its execution as a mistake — is expressing concern that Mr. McCain might be coming under increased influence from a competing camp, the neoconservatives, whose thinking dominated President Bush’s first term and played a pivotal role in building the case for war.

This article is trying to set up tension where none really exists: The competition for McCain’s foreign policy soul is over. The [neocons cleaned up](#), took the trophy, and went for beers (or maybe wine spritzers.) Of course McCain is still going to seek and take advice from a gallery of venerated foreign policy wise men, but the idea that there’s actually a conflict between the neocon and realist camps for John McCain’s attention is nonsense. Not only has John McCain long pitched his tent in the [neoconservative camp](#), he advocates a view of American power diametrically [opposed to the realism of people like Henry Kissinger](#) and Brent Scowcroft, whose pragmatic approach the neocons have derided in the past as an ideology of “managed decline.”

In a 2006 article tracking McCain’s foreign policy views, John Judis wrote that, starting in 1998, McCain began to [“place his new interventionist instincts within a larger ideological framework.”](#) That ideological framework was neoconservatism.”

McCain began reading the Weekly Standard and conferring with its editors, particularly Bill Kristol...When McCain wanted to hire a new legislative aide, his chief of staff, Mark Salter—himself a former aide to neoconservative Jeanne Kirkpatrick, consulted with Kristol, who recommended a young protege named Daniel McKivergan...Randy Scheunemann, who had drafted the Iraq Liberation Act and was on the board of Kristol’s Project for a New American Century, became McCain’s foreign policy adviser. **One person who has worked closely with Kristol says of Kristol and McCain, “They are exceptionally, exceptionally close.”**



McCain espoused a realist point of view in the 1980s and early 90s, supporting the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon even before the Marine barracks bombing sparked Ronald Reagan's quick retreat, and later opposing the U.S. mission in Somalia (even [introducing an amendment to cut off funds for the troops](#) there, a move he later said he regretted). After the quick U.S. victory of the first Gulf War, however, his views began to move in a more interventionist direction, and by the late 1990's he was firmly in the interventionist camp.

Unlike Bush, who came into office without having really thought much about foreign policy (apart from having derided "nation-building" during the campaign) and then landed upon neoconservatism after casting about for a suitable ideological framework for his post-9/11 vengeance policy, McCain derives his strong views on [the vigorous and unconstrained exercise of American power](#) from a righteous belief in American "[national greatness](#)."

The bottom line is that John McCain has been tied to the neocons, both personally and ideologically, for nearly a decade. Jacob Heilbrunn, author of [They Knew They Were Right](#), a history of the neoconservatives (and a self-described former neocon himself) described the relationship this way: "[McCain represents for the neocons the ultimate synthesis of war hero and politician](#)."

And McCain, in turn, has been increasingly drawn to the neocons' militaristic vision of the U.S. as an empire that can set wrong aright around the globe.[...] **If McCain becomes president, the neocons will be in charge.**

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/04/10/mccain-neocon-part-1/>]



McCain — The Neocon Candidate (Part 2): 100 Years Of Cluelessness

Matthew Duss

As I [wrote in Part 1](#) of this series, John McCain shares with the neoconservatives a similar expansive view of American power. What he also shares, however, is an alarmingly simplistic view of Islamic extremism.

One of McCain's favorite talking points over the last few months has been that radical Islamic extremism is "[the transcendent challenge of the 21st century](#)." He used this formulation in his [Foreign Affairs manifesto](#) last year. It was also featured prominently in his March 26 [foreign policy address](#), and he tends to use it whenever he talks about national security.

For all of McCain's media-abetted posturing as a foreign policy expert, however, there's no evidence that McCain's ever really understood the region from whence comes this transcendent challenge. Casting this struggle in grandiose terms is a way to hide the fact that he doesn't really understand what it is.

Here's what McCain said in his [foreign policy address on March 26](#):

This challenge is transcendent not because it is the only one we face. There are many dangers in today's world, and our foreign policy must be agile and effective at dealing with all of them. But the threat posed by the terrorists is unique. They alone devote all their energies and indeed their very lives to murdering innocent men, women, and children. They alone seek nuclear weapons and other tools of mass destruction not to defend themselves or to enhance their prestige or to give them a stronger hand in world affairs but to use against us wherever and whenever they can.

McCain's website contains similarly vague references to "[the war against the terrorists](#)." McCain has never really defined who these terrorists are, apart from "radical Islamists," nor does he suggest any difference in either goals or ideology among the various groups so labeled.

And that's what's really scary. As far as McCain is concerned, it's all one big Islamofascist (sic) front against the West, Al Qaeda equals Iran equals Muqtada al-Sadr equals Hamas equals Hezbollah equals whomever's shooting at us this week. This is the same sort of thinking that got us into Iraq. And we shouldn't be surprised about this, because John McCain [is being advised by many of the very same people](#) who put us there. Like his advisers, McCain tends to cast all of these groups and movements together under the heading "radical Islamic terrorism" and proceed as if this were actually a strategically meaningful category.

McCain has made a number of gaffes over the past few months, suggesting on several occasions that [Iran was training Al Qaeda](#), then [briefly identifying Al Qaeda as Shia](#) at Tuesday's hearings. While I do think it's significant that McCain may not, at this late date, have yet committed these things to memory, I think it's even more significant that, in McCain's foreign policy view, they don't even really matter.

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/04/11/mccain-neocon-part-2/>]



‘The Fact Is’ John McCain Is Confused About Iran

Matt Duss

My [previous post](#) referred to John McCain’s confusion over who really sets Iran’s foreign policy, as demonstrated under questioning by reporter Joe Klein.

KLEIN: According to most diplomatic experts, the supreme leader Ali Khamenei is the guy who’s in charge of Iranian foreign policy, and also in charge of the nuclear program. But you never mention him. Why do you always keep on talking about Ahmadinejad since he doesn’t have power in that realm?

MCCAIN: Again, I respectfully disagree, when **he’s the person that comes to the United Nations and declares his country’s policy is the extermination of the state of Israel, quote, in his words, “wipe them off of the map” then I know that he is speaking for the Iranian government, and articulating their policy**, and was elected, and is running for reelection, as the leader of that country... **The fact is that he’s the acknowledged leader of that country.** You may disagree, that’s your right to do so, but I think if you asked any Average American who the leader of Iran is, I think they’d know.

The fact is that John McCain is confused as to who is really the leader of Iran. (Big hint: He has the words “[Supreme Leader](#)” in his title.) There is no real dispute here: Iranian foreign policy is formulated and set by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iran’s National Security Council. Ahmadinejad may make a lot of ridiculous statements, but the fact is that he has very little influence in this regard.

As for McCain’s attempt to derive Iranian policy from Ahmadinejad’s comments, while Iran is certainly hostile to Israel, two days after Ahmadinejad made his notorious threat to “wipe Israel off the map,” the president “[was reined in by the Supreme Leader](#), who publicly reiterated Iran’s policy of nonaggression to all UN members.” This was widely interpreted as a public rebuke of Ahmadinejad. According to Iran expert Karim Sadjadpour, “[\[Khamenei\] made it very clear: enough of this talk.](#)”

This isn’t to suggest that Iran’s posture toward Israel is appropriate or defensible — it certainly is not. Just that the policies of the Iranian regime, and the way in which it perceives its own interests, are quite a bit more complex than John McCain and other anti-Iran hawks seem to understand.

Here’s the video of the exchange, which shows McCain sticking to his guns and simply refusing to accept that he is, in fact, wrong on the point.

Read the full transcript:



KLEIN: I've done some research –

MCCAIN: I have, too.

KLEIN: And also checked with the Obama campaign, and he's never mentioned Ahmadinejad directly by name. He did say that he would negotiate with the leaders, but as you know –

MCCAIN: I kind of thought that Ahmadinejad was the leader. Maybe I'm mistaken.

KLEIN: Maybe you are.

MCCAIN: Maybe. I don't think so, though.

KLEIN: According to most diplomatic experts, the supreme leader Ali Khamenei is the guy who's in charge of Iranian foreign policy, and also in charge of the nuclear program. But you never mention him. Why do you always keep on talking about Ahmadinejad since he doesn't have power in that realm?

MCCAIN: Again, I respectfully disagree, when he's the person that comes to the United Nations and declares his country's policy is the extermination of the state of Israel, quote, in his words, "wipe them off of the map" then I know that he is speaking for the Iranian government, and articulating their policy, and was elected, and is running for reelection, as the leader of that country.

KLEIN: One more question on that

MCCAIN: The fact is that he's the acknowledged leader of that country. You may disagree, that's your right to do so, but I think if you asked any Average American who the leader of Iran is, I think they'd know.

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/05/20/mccain-confused-iran/>]



McCain's Hard-Line Rhetoric 'Increases Prestige' Of Other Hard-Liners

Matt Duss

Warning against the legitimizing effect of talks between the American and Iranian presidents, John McCain said today in a speech before the National Restaurant Association in Chicago that such high-level meetings “[would increase the prestige of an implacable foe of the United States](#)”:

[Meetings would] reinforce his [Ahmadinejad's] confidence that Iran's dedication to acquiring nuclear weapons, supporting terrorists and destroying the State of Israel had succeeded in winning concessions from the most powerful nation on earth. And he is unlikely to abandon the dangerous ambitions that will have given him a prominent role on the world stage.[...]

An unconditional summit meeting with the next American president would confer both international legitimacy on the Iranian president and could strengthen him domestically when he is unpopular among the Iranian people.

Here's another area where McCain reveals his ignorance of the Iranian system, and of the effects of his own self-gratifying rhetoric. While Ahmadinejad enjoys influence by virtue of his being a public figure, it is not he but Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, and Iran's National Security Council, who [set Iranian foreign policy](#).

As for “increasing the prestige” of Ahmadinejad, as Iran analysts Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh pointed out last December, Ahmadinejad's prestige has benefited from the bellicose rhetoric coming from American conservatives, allowing him “[to suppress dissent and divert attention from domestic woes](#) to international crises he is only too happy to fuel.”

Clearly, Ahmadinejad would like nothing better than for John McCain to continue Bush's policy of confrontation and escalation. And McCain seems all too willing to oblige, as he hysterically calls “radical Islamic terrorism” the “[transcendental challenge of the century](#),” carelessly casting together groups and movements with conflicting goals and ideologies and treating them as a single monolithic enemy. McCain still doesn't seem to understand that [Iran and Al Qaeda are two very different groups](#), representing two different threats. And McCain and Bush seem to be the last people in the world to figure out that their Iraq policies have [empowered Iran's hard-liners](#) and weakened moderates and other U.S. allies throughout the Middle East. Yet McCain continues to persist as if these policies have worked.

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/05/19/mccain-hard-liners/>]



McCain Has No Answer For Tackling Al Qaeda Strongholds In Pakistan and Afghanistan

Our guest blogger is [Brian Katulis](#), a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress Action Fund.

Sen. John McCain's [speech yesterday](#) attracted a lot of media attention for what he said about Iraq –but it is what he DIDN'T say on Afghanistan and Pakistan that should worry most Americans.

Conservatives like McCain have demonstrated that they may be strong on rhetoric but actually lacking in clear ideas on how to truly tackle the continued threat posed by the global Al Qaeda movement.

As the threat from Al Qaeda becomes more diffuse, U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies have reached a strikingly unanimous conclusion that the core organizational leadership has reformed itself. Its location? Pakistan.

Al Qaeda has, in the words of the Director for National Intelligence's February 2008 [Annual Threat Assessment](#), "retained or regenerated key elements of its capability, including top leadership, operational mid-level lieutenants, and de facto safe haven in Pakistan's border area with Afghanistan, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or the FATA." The [CIA](#), [State Department](#), and [Joint Chiefs of Staff](#) have all echoed this warning in recent months. The threat is not exclusive to America: terror plots in [Denmark](#), [Germany](#), and [Spain](#), as well as a score of attacks within Pakistan itself, have all been traced back to the FATA.

If Pakistan represents the center of gravity in the fight against Al Qaeda, you would not be able to tell it from any policies put forth by a conservative political establishment still fixated on Iraq. As Congress' independent non-partisan investigatory body, the Government Accountability Office, [recently concluded](#), the Bush administration still lacks a unified strategy for dealing with the FATA that incorporates all elements of U.S. national power.

And for most of Bush's tenure in office, a loyal Congress has abdicated any responsibility for holding the administration accountable for this. In its two years from 2005-2006, **the 109th Congress managed to hold just one single hearing on Pakistan in all the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and Oversight committees of both the House and Senate combined.** Since the shift in power that brought more progressives into the 110th Congress, there have been at least fifteen congressional hearings on Pakistan alone.



McCain, the presumptive leader of the American conservative movement, simply follows in the path of the Bush administration's lack of attention to what is one of the most pressing national security challenges. A few lines may make it into some speeches, but it is pretty clear that McCain and his team, like most other conservatives, have not given much thought to Pakistan. Senator McCain's Columbus speech envisions a cooperative government of Pakistan and predicts that after four years of a McCain administration, "there is no longer any place in the world al Qaeda can consider a safe haven". But the ["National Security" issues section](#) of his campaign website is completely empty of references to Pakistan and the Al Qaeda presence there, or of any policies to close the safe havens that exist there now.

When McCain does attempt to directly address Pakistan in speeches or comments to the media, he frequently betrays an ignorance of the complex realities of its internal political challenges. Candidate McCain's [November 2007 Foreign Affairs article](#) laying out his prospective foreign policy agenda makes only passing reference to Pakistan, and suggests that the "Talibanization" of the country is imminent. In fact, militancy in Pakistan is largely concentrated in the FATA, Islamist political parties lost in large numbers in the most recent elections, and both U.S. and Pakistani military officials have dismissed any possibility that the country's nuclear arsenal could fall into the hands of terrorists.

Like President Bush, who has relied on him as an exclusive interlocutor since 2001, McCain credits President Pervez Musharraf with saving Pakistan from itself. McCain has [described Pakistan as a "failed state"](#) prior to the assumption of power by then-General Musharraf in a military coup, underplaying the role of the Pakistani military in suppressing democratic forces and its historic support for militant groups operating under an Islamist banner as a means of checking domestic opposition and destabilizing its neighbors.

While conservatives remain fixated on signaling toughness on national security, a look beneath the surface finds that they actually have no clear plan to make America more secure from the Al Qaeda movement that killed three thousand Americans on September 11th. Like President Bush, conservatives remain mired in political rhetoric and posturing, rather than offering a clear strategy to make Americans more secure

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/05/16/mccain-pakistan/>]



FLASHBACK: In 2003, McCain Blasted Administration's Indefinite Detention Of Detainees

Ken Gude and Amanda Terkel

Yesterday, the Supreme Court [ruled](#) that Guantanamo Bay detainees have the right to challenge their detention in civilian courts. The Bush administration and its allies quickly criticized the decision:

President Bush: “It was a deeply divided court and I strongly agree with those who dissented. The dissent was based upon those serious concerns about U.S. national security.” [\[Link\]](#)

Sen. John McCain (R-AZ): “The United States Supreme Court yesterday rendered a decision which I think is one of the worst decisions in the history of this country. Senator Graham, and Senator Lieberman, and I...made it very clear that these are enemy combatants, these are people who are not citizens. They do not and never have been given the rights that citizens of this country have. [6/13/08]

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC): “I am deeply disappointed in what I think is a tremendously dangerous and irresponsible ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court. ... The court has conferred upon civilian judges the right to make military decisions.” [\[Link\]](#)

McCain and Graham’s objections sharply contrast with their positions in 2003, when they wrote a [letter](#) to then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, urging him to swiftly resolve the status of Guantanamo detainees:

The treatment of the detainees is not an issue. However, a serious concern arises over the disposition of the detainees - a considerable number of whom have been held for two years. [...]

Yet, we firmly believe it is now time to make a decision on how the United States will move forward regarding the detainees, and to take that important next step. **A serious process must be established in the very near term either to formally treat and process the detainees as war criminals or to return them to their countries for appropriate judicial action.**

On Dec. 13, 2003, the New York Times also reported that McCain said, “They may not have any rights under the Geneva Conventions as far as I’m concerned, but they have rights under various human rights declarations. And one of them is the right not to be detained indefinitely.”



Five years after their letter, just “[one detainee has received a verdict.](#)” Approximately 270 are still detained there and “about half are considered too dangerous to release, even though the government does not have enough evidence to charge them.”

This Supreme Court ruling will inevitably lead to a “flood of new litigation” challenging the Bush administration’s right to hold these detainees. Detainees will then finally get a decision as to their status — exactly as McCain and Graham requested.

In light of these 2003 remarks, it’s unclear why McCain considers this Supreme Court ruling the “worst decision in history,” except for the fact that it isn’t what the Bush administration wanted.

– [Ken Gude](#) and Amanda Terkel

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/06/13/mccain-gitmo-sc/>]



McCain Doesn't Understand McCain's Position on Guantanamo

Our guest blogger is [Ken Gude](#), Associate Director of the International Rights and Responsibility Program at the Center for American Progress Action Fund.

Last week's Supreme Court ruling affirming the Guantanamo detainees' constitutional right to habeas corpus further narrowed the legal distinction between holding them in Cuba and in the United States. The Bush administration picked Guantanamo precisely because it believed the American military base on the eastern tip of Cuba was beyond the reach of any court. With that notion rightly put to rest, supporters of closing Guantanamo like John McCain should be encouraged, as there is now much less of an argument against moving some of the detainees to the military prison at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, as he proposes.

That's why I find his reaction to the Boumediene decision so odd. McCain unleashed a full broadside at the court the day after the ruling, calling it "[one of the worst decisions](#) in the history of this country... Our first obligation is the safety and security of this nation, and the men and women who defend it. This decision will harm our ability to do that."

At [issue in Boumediene](#) is whether habeas rights extended to Guantanamo. There has never been any doubt that any individual in the United States possesses habeas rights. McCain is on the record saying, as president, he "[would immediately close Guantanamo Bay](#), [and] move all the prisoners to Fort Leavenworth." That action would have exactly the same effect as the Court's decision in Boumediene.

McCain goes on to claim that ~~his plan to close Guantanamo~~ the Supreme Court's ruling is "[going to have the courts flooded](#) with so-called, quote, Habeas Corpus suits against the government, whether it be about the diet, whether it be about the reading material." This would be silly if it wasn't so tragic. Garden variety habeas petitions from inmates in American prisons may more often deal with diet than detention, but the detainees at Guantanamo are not asking for better food, many believe that they are wrongly imprisoned and are contesting the lawfulness of their confinement.

Let's look at the facts of the named plaintiff in the case, [Lakhdar Boumediene](#). Boumediene is a Bosnia citizen of Algerian descent who was arrested in October 2001 in Bosnia by Bosnian officials after American intelligence analysts in Bosnia feared that Boumediene and five other Algerian-Bosnians were part of a plot to attack American targets there. After four months in detention, the Bosnian Supreme Court ruled that there was no evidence to continue to hold the six men and ordered their release in January 2002. American officials immediately took custody the six and shipped them off to Guantanamo. That was more than six years ago.

Fixing the mess at Guantanamo is going to be enormously difficult. The Bush administration has made so many catastrophic mistakes that there are no good or easy solutions. If John McCain doesn't understand the implications of his proposal to close the prison, how can we trust him to make the right call on the really hard questions that are sure to arise in any genuine effort to close Guantanamo?

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/06/19/mccain-doesnt-understand/>]



Scheunemann: Just Another Lobbyist On The Straight Talk Express

Matthew Duss

Via [TAPPED](#), John McCain's foreign policy spokesman [Randy Scheunemann](#) recently gave an interview to Radio Free Europe about the [growing tension](#) between Russia and Georgia. Scheunemann took a hard line against Russia's "undermining of Georgian sovereignty" by [moving to establish direct ties](#) with breakaway regions of Georgia.

Interestingly, neither Scheunemann nor the interviewer mentioned that Randy Scheunemann used to be employed [as a lobbyist for the Georgian government](#). That's right, the person who's giving John McCain advice on Russia and Georgia was "registered with the U.S. Department of Justice as a foreign agent working on behalf of the government of Georgia."

Scheunemann is a longtime neoconservative activist and lobbyist. In addition to working for the government of Georgia, Scheunemann was the director of the [Committee for the Liberation of Iraq](#), a neocon front group spun off from the [Project for the New American Century](#) (where Scheunemann also works as a [foreign policy and national security analyst](#)) which lobbied for the invasion of Iraq. Scheunemann's firm, Scheunemann and Associates, also [lobbied for the National Rifle Association](#) between 1999 and 2002.

Of course, Scheunemann is only one of the many [former lobbyists](#) helping to drive the Straight Talk Express. In fact, as [Media Matters reported](#), "McCain has more [current and former lobbyists working on his campaign staff](#) than any other candidate in the 2008 presidential election."

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/04/30/scheunemann-lobbyist-georgia/>]



John McCain's Buffet-Style Foreign Policy

Matthew Duss

A few unforced errors from John McCain on the campaign trail. At a town meeting in Denver, trying to build suspense for the upcoming roll-out of his energy plan, [McCain assured an admiring audience](#):

My friends, I will have an energy policy that we will be talking about, which will **eliminate our dependence on oil from the Middle East that will — that will then prevent us — that will prevent us from having ever to send our young men and women into conflict again in the Middle East.**

This is bad on a couple levels. There's the obvious gaffe in suggesting that the U.S. is fighting the Iraq war over oil (something which [many already believe](#)). Then there's the fact that the U.S. already gets the [majority of its oil from regions other than the Middle East](#). Finally, regardless of how much oil the U.S. does or does not get from the Middle East, other countries will certainly still be getting it from there, developing economies such as China's absolutely depend upon it, and thus securing and ensuring continued access to Middle East oil will be a central element of any global economic and security framework for the foreseeable future. One would hope that anyone running for president understands this.

At a different event, McCain [tried again to distance himself](#) from the “[100 years](#)” remark, and offered this bit of straight talk about America's future presence in Iraq:

After we win the war in Iraq ... then I'm talking about **a security arrangement that may or may not be the same kind of thing we have with South — with Korea.**

In 2005, McCain [rejected the South Korea model for Iraq](#), saying that he “hoped we could bring them [the troops] all home.” [Last August](#), McCain said that the Korea model was “exactly” the right idea. Then [in November he changed his mind again](#), saying the he didn't think the South Korea analogy was a good one. Then in January, he was back in favor of the South Korea model, offering it in support of his “[100 years](#)” remark.

Now it appears that McCain has settled on a little from column A, and a little from column B.

[<http://thinkprogress.org/wonkroom/2008/05/02/john-mccains-buffet-style-foreign-policy/>]



In Search of Sustainable Security: Linking National Security, Human Security, and Collective Security to Protect America and Our World

By Gayle Smith

Not long ago I conducted an informal survey during a trip to East Africa, asking everyone I met how they view America. My interlocutors were from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. They were, in the main, educated and working in the private sector, the policy world, or government. Many of them hold dual passports.

Their answers were strikingly similar. Most of them said in one way or another that the “idea” of America has changed for the worse, and most asserted that they are less interested in traveling to, working in, or working with the United States now than in the past. But most disconcerting was the hope, expressed with striking consistency, that China would soon attain its full power so that American hegemony could be brought in check.

This was not for any love of China’s ideology or even the aggressive aid and investment strategies Beijing is deploying in the developing world. It was, as a young woman attorney explained, because “America used to be the champion for all of us, and now it is the champion only for itself.”

That much of the world has lost faith in America bodes ill for our national security because our role in the world is secured not simply by our military power or economic clout, but also by our ability to compel other nations to follow our lead. The next president will have the opportunity to craft a modern national security strategy that can equip the United States to lead a majority of capable, democratic states in pursuit of a global common good—a strategy that can guide a secure America that is the world’s “champion for all of us.”

But positioning America to lead in a 21st century world will take more than extending a hand to our allies, fixing a long list of misdirected policies, or crafting a new national security strategy that is tough but also smart. With globalization providing the immutable backdrop to our foreign policy, America is today competing on a global playing field that is more complex, dynamic, and interdependent and thus far less certain than in the past.

Leading in this new world will require a fundamental shift from our outdated notion of national security to a more modern concept of sustainable security—that is, our security as defined by the contours of a world gone global and shaped by our common humanity. Sustainable security combines three approaches:

- National security, or the safety of the United States



- Human security, or the well-being and safety of people
- Collective security, or the shared interests of the entire world

Sustainable security, in short, can shape our continued ability to simultaneously prevent or defend against real-time threats to America, reduce the sweeping human insecurity around the world, and manage long term threats to our collective, global security. This new approach takes into account the many (and ongoing) changes that have swept our planet since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. To understand the efficacy of this new doctrine, though, requires a quick look at this new global landscape.

The New Realities of the 21st Century

During his presidency, Bill Clinton spoke often and passionately about our global interdependence and of positioning America to cross a “bridge to the 21st century.” Once across, however, the Bush administration took a sharp right turn. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the administration narrowly defined the quest for America’s security, distinct from and uninformed by the interests of the larger world we inhabit.

The challenge before us, President Bush asserted, was the struggle between good and evil, our strategy was to wage his so called “war on terror,” and our goal was to shape a “world without tyranny.” Our primary tool was a strong military backed by the resolve to use force without seeking a “permission slip” from the international community. And our object was the “axis of evil,” and the rest of the world was either “with us or against us.” Anyone who suggested that it might not be quite that simple was quickly and effectively discounted as “soft on terrorism.”

Despite ambitious rhetoric about the promotion of our core values—of leading “the long march to freedom” and pursuing the “non-negotiable demands of human dignity”—the Bush administration has culled its allies not from among those countries most committed to democracy, but from among those who have oil. The Bush administration had to leverage all of its diplomatic and economic clout to persuade the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” to participate at all in the invasion of Iraq. Then, the administration offered up not the shining example of an America where human and civil rights prevail, but an America where Guantanamo, Abu Gharab, and illegal wire-tapping are justified by an elusive, greater purpose.

The United States has for the last five years defined America’s role in the world with near exclusive reference to the invasion of Iraq. The deaths of 4,000 American soldiers, maiming of tens of thousands more, and the expenditure of well over \$400 billion, has failed to lay the foundations for either stability or democracy. And as defined by the Bush administration, the “War on Terror” has fared no better: Al Qaeda has not been defeated, and Osama bin Laden, its leader and the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, has yet to be captured.



Our losses, however, extend far beyond the edges of a failed Iraq policy or the shortcomings of an ill-defined “war on terror.” We have also lost precious time, and are well behind the curve in our now tardy efforts to tackle the global challenges that are already shaping our future—climate change, energy insecurity, growing resource scarcity, the proliferation of illegal syndicates moving people, arms, and money— all of them global challenges that have been steadfastly ignored and in some cases denied by an ideologically-driven Bush administration lodged firmly in its own distinct version of the here and now.

Perhaps most damaging, however, is this: We have lost our moral standing in the eyes of many who now believe that the United States has only its own national interests at heart, and has little understanding of or regard for either global security or our common humanity. Just as potent as the unsustainable federal budget deficit George W. Bush will leave in his wake is the unsustainable national security deficit that he will pass on to his successor. Whoever prevails in November will face a daunting list of real-time national security imperatives, among them:

- A spiraling crisis in Iraq
- Afghanistan’s steady implosion
- A fragile Pakistan
- An emboldened Iran
- A raging genocide in Sudan
- The growing insecurity of our oil supplies
- A nuclear North Korea
- An increasingly dangerous Arab–Israeli conflict

Just to name a few. But the next president will also face looming and less tangible threats to our national security in a world where power has grown more diffuse and threats more potent—a world in which our security depends not only on the behavior of states, but also on a host of transnational threats that transcend national borders, such as terrorism, pandemics, money laundering, and the drug trade.

And finally, the next president will be confronted by the more subtle but potent threats and moral challenges arising from sweeping human insecurity in a world divided by sharp disparities between rich and poor, between those nations actively engaged in fast-paced globalization and those left behind, and between people who have tangible reasons to believe in a secure and prosperous world and those who daily confront the evidence that violence is a more potent tool for change than is hope.



Sustainable Security Is the Answer

The world has changed profoundly during the last 50 years, but our concept of national security has not. The concept of national security came into being after World War II, and has had as its primary focus a world dominated by the nation state. In this new era of globalization, we continue to rely upon the narrow definition offered by George Kennan, who in 1948 described our national security as “the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers.” While Kennan’s definition might have been relevant to the era of containment, it is insufficient in today’s integrated and interdependent world.

A modern concept of national security demands more than an ability to protect and defend the United States. It requires that we expand our goal to include the attainment of sustainable security.

The pursuit of sustainable security requires more than a reliance on our conventional power to deflect threats to the United States, but also that we maintain the moral authority to lead a global effort to overcome threats to our common security. With its global scope, sustainable security demands that we focus not only on the security of nation states, but also of people, on human security. An emerging concept borne of multidisciplinary analyses of international affairs, economics, development, and conflict, human security targets the fundamental freedoms—from want and from fear—that define human dignity.

National security and human security are compatible but distinct. National security focuses on the security of the state, and governments are its primary clients, while human security is centered on the security of individuals and thus on a diverse array of stakeholders. National security aims to ensure the ability of states to protect their citizens from external aggression; human security focuses on the management of threats and challenges that affect people everywhere— inside, outside, and across state borders.

A national security strategy is commonly crafted in real time and focused on tangible, proximate threats, while a human security strategy aimed at improving the human condition assumes a longer-term horizon. Sustainable security combines the two, thus allowing for a focus on the twin challenges of protecting the United States while also championing our global humanity—not simply because it is the right thing to do, but also because our security demands it.

For a majority of the world’s people, security is defined in the very personal terms of survival. The primary threats to this human security have far less to do with terrorism than with poverty and conflict, with governments that cannot deliver or turn on their own citizens, and with a global economy that offers differentiated access and opportunities to the powerful and the powerless. For literally billions of the world’s people, weapons of mass destruction are not nuclear bombs in the hands of Iran, but the proliferation of small arms. For them, freedom is not defined simply by the demise of dictators, but also by the rise of economic opportunity. Ensuring our security in today’s world, however, also



requires a focus on collective security. Among the major challenges that the United States will face over the coming decades are climate change, water scarcity, food insecurity, and environmental degradation. These are challenges that will threaten the economic well-being and security of all countries on earth, and by dint of their global nature, their effects cannot be overcome unless we adopt a global perspective and strategy.

Take the example of the world food crisis that emerged in the spring of 2008. No single cause triggered the near doubling of world food prices. Indeed, the causes included the skyrocketing price of oil, the growth of the middle class in the developing world (and thus rising demand in China and India), droughts in Australia and Ukraine, a weak dollar, and the expansion of biofuels production in the United States and Europe.

The consequent rise in food prices triggered riots or protests in Europe, Mexico, Egypt, Afghanistan, and several other countries, and plunged millions in the developing world into abject poverty. In the United States, the number of Americans seeking assistance from food banks rose 20 percent to 25 percent.

Or consider “transnational threats,” such as money laundering, terrorism, and international drug and crime syndicates, all of which transcend state borders. These are threats that pose risks to the United States, but also to the well-being of our allies, to global stability, and to the world economy.

A national security approach seeks to prevent or reduce the effects of these trends and threats to the United States; a collective security approach, in contrast, assumes that the United States must act globally—in partnership with allies and in coordination with international institutions—to prevent or manage them.

Sustainable Security in Practice

Crafting a sustainable security strategy requires three fundamental steps. The first is to prioritize, integrate, and coordinate the global development policies and programs pursued by the United States. While our military power provides a critical and effective tool for managing our security, our support for the well-being of the world’s people will not only provide us with a moral foundation from which to lead but will also enhance our ability to manage effectively the range of threats and trends that shape the modern world.

Second, we must modernize our foreign aid system in order to allow the United States to make strategic investments in global economic development that can help us to build capable states, open societies, and a global economy that benefits the world’s majority. Third, we must re-enter the international arena, stepping up to the plate to lead the reform of international institutions that have not kept pace, and to create new institutions that are needed to manage our collective security.

In the pages that follow, this paper will present the challenges that threaten our national, human, and collective security in order to show just how important it is for the next



president to embrace these sustainable security policies. As this report will demonstrate, changing course will be difficult, but changing course is imperative to secure the future prosperity of humanity— an original and time-tested American value.

[http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/06/sustainable_security.html]

ENDNOTES

ⁱ NBC, “Meet the Press,” 9/22/02.

ⁱⁱ NBC, “Meet the Press,” 3/30/03.

ⁱⁱⁱ NBC, “The Today Show,” 3/20/03.

^{iv} MSNBC, “Hardball,” 4/23/03.

^v ABC News, “Good Morning America,” 4/9/03.

^{vi} NBC, “Meet the Press,” 3/30/03.

^{vii} NBC, “Meet the Press,” 2/20/05.

^{viii} ABC News, “This Week,” 3/07/04.

^{ix} Fox News Channel, “Hannity & Colmes,” 5/12/04.

^x Fox News, “The Big Story,” 5/10/04.

^{xi} Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 3/27/03; National Journal, 2/15/03.